Abstract-It is critical to minimize the cargo theft during transport while ensuring the integrity of the entire cargo loads or to transfer the ownership of a tagged item to another owner in the supply chain management. However, no such protocol or mechanism is proposed to achieve both of the above requirements. In this paper, we propose novel designated ownership transfer with grouping proof, which simultaneously generates grouping proofs and authenticates the consistency between the receipt proof and pick proof while ensuring the ownership of the cargo is being transferred to the new designated owner in one attempt. In addition, our proposed scheme can have not only robustness against attacks (such as replay attacks, denial of service attacks, denial of proof etc.), but also security features (such as forward/backward secrecy and message integrity).
I. INTRODUCTION
In supply chain management (SCM for short), Mobile Radio Frequency Identification (RFID short) has rapidly become a widely adopted technique to track and identify objects in the last few years. A RFID system consists of mobile readers, a backend server that acts as a trusted third party (TTP for short) and tags which can be further classified into two types: active tags and passive tags. An active tag usually contains an internal power source (typically a battery) to continuously power the tag thus having a longer reading range, whereas a passive tag relies on the radio frequency energy transmitted from the reader to power itself, therefore, having a shorter reading range than active tags. In SCM, passive tags are more widely used because of the lower implementation cost. To elaborate more on tags, active tags contains an internal power source (typically a battery) to continuously power the tags, whereas passive tags rely on the radio frequency energy transmitted from the reader to power itself. In the early stage of SCM, the tags are employed to store some information about the cargo and to facilitate automated stocktaking. However, there are more and more challenges that arise in cargo-theft-related cases during the later stage of SCM [6] . The important problem is to identify whether the supplier, transport or recipient is the thief according to some evidence. In 2005, Saito and Sakurai proposed a grouping proof protocol to solve the mentioned problem [11] . Saito and Sakurai's proposed protocol allows the mobile reader to generate a proof for further verification during the cargo transfer, where the proof means that existence for a group of tags. In case of dispute, the generated proof will be sent to the TTP for further verification. In the event of a dispute, the generated proof can be used as an undeniable proof for both parties, proving that the cargo has been delivered or received [14] . Other related works are included in [1, 2, 3, 10, 12] .
As the cargo has been delivered to a new party, the ownership of that cargo should also be transferred over simultaneously. Most of the ownership transfer protocols follow the following assumptions: After the ownership transfer is completed, the former owner can no longer gain access to the RFID tags, and the new owner has the ability to prove its ownership by performing a mutual authentication with the RFID tags [4, 7-9, 13, 15] . With the help of ownership transfer protocol, both parties can trade the tagged objects more easily. Some researchers work for reducing security threats such as a replay attack [11] , a denial-of-service (DOS) attack [5] , a manin-the-middle (MITM) attack, etc..
The handover process between the supplier/retailer and the recipient requires a grouping proof protocol to be executed first to ensure that all the cargo is in place before executing the ownership transfer protocol. To complete the handover process, it requires two protocols. Hence, that is not only inefficient but time consuming. With more and more security threats in SCM, there should be a complete RFID protocol to provide message integrity and privacy. Consider two scenarios in which a malicious party might intercept the communication messages transmitted between tags and mobile readers. The first scenario is that the malicious party might re-transmit the messages to execute unauthorized operations, such as generating bogus proof or fake authentication. In the second one, the malicious new owner might attempt to gain access the previous transaction made by the former owner, or the former owner might try to access the further transaction made by the new owner. To solve the above problems, it is necessary to combine grouping proof protocols and ownership transfer protocols.
In this paper, we propose a novel designated ownership transfer protocol with grouping proof that can achieve message integrity and privacy, simultaneously. Even though both ownership transfer and grouping proof protocols are designed for different purpose but they do share some similarity such as authentication is required before exchanging information, generating random numbers to derive fresh messages etc. By incorporating the similarities in both protocol into one, our proposed protocol will not only retain the main security and privacy features in grouping proof protocols and ownership transfer protocols, but also reduce the message/responses needed as the transfer of the ownership and the generation of the proof is being done in one attempt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The detailed proposed protocol is presented in Section II, and the security analysis for the proposed protocol is given in Section III. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section IV.
II. PROPOSED PORTOCOL
Our proposed protocol is based on the hierarchical management framework based grouping proof protocol proposed by Yang et al. [14] . Our protocol consists of four phases: Initialization Phase, Integrity Verification Phase (3 stages), Dispute Resolution Phase, and Ownership Transfer Phase (2 stages). The notations used in the proposed protocol are listed in the table I. Table I . Notations a transporter who delivers cargo a cargo shipment with a tag collection the q-th recipient who receives the cargo a third-party clock tag providing time in the offline phase an identification code for an identification code of an identification code of the reader used by an identification code of an identification code of the -th reader used by an identification code of the -th tag for the -th group code for a hash value for verifying a secret key shared between and a secret key shared between and a secret key shared between and a secret key shared between and a secret key shared between and a session key shared among readers / a public/private key pair for / a public/private key pair a random number generated by a random number generated by a random number generated by a random number generated by a random number generated by a timestamp generated by a system time of an encryption function with two inputs: the message ( ) and the symmetric key ( ) a signing function with two inputs and a key-hashing function for generating message authentication codes, where the inputs are and a hashing function with an input a judgement of whether the grouping proof for is generated in the online or offline phase a ownership transfer protocol
A. The Initialization Phase
To ensure secure multicast connection among the readers and q tags in , the verifier generates a k-ary group key with a height difference of the subtree of 1( ) using the secret key that is shared between the verifier and the tags . Figure 1 illustrates an example of a 3-ary group key ( is the starting node) generated for a set of 23 tags; the group key is employed to encrypt the multicast messages transmitted to the tags numbering from to , and the tags , , can decrypt the multicast messages that are encrypted with the group key by using their own shared keys , , , respectively. A verification code is also generated for q tags in according to the following equation:
As the verifier has generated the verification codes , the group key , and the timestamp , and then, transmitted them to the transporter's reader to be forwarded to recipient's reader.
B. The Integrity Verification Phase (Stage 1)
As illustrated in Figure 2 , Stage 1 indicates when the transporter's reader cannot connect to the verification server, therefore the timestamp received in the initialization phase will be transmitted to a trusted clock tag to acquire a trustworthy initial time .
1.)
After the clock tag received a timestamp from the reader , it uses its own identification code along with the verifier's shared key , the clock tag current timestamp , and the received timestamp to compute a signed timestamp . The message verification code is also computed, and then, transmitted back to the reader along with . Once the response message is sent to the reader by the clock tag, the will compute to validate the received signed timestamp by using the clock tag check code . 
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C. The Integrity Verification Phase (Stage 2)
In this stage, the reader uses the distributed keys to encrypt the recipient's identification code , the ownership transfer request , the timestamp , the signed timestamp , the group key set for the child node reader , and the tag verification code set , and then transmit the ciphertext until all leaf nodes have been reached. For example, as indicate in Figure 3 , the reader first uses the key to encrypt , , , , , and , and then transmits them to the reader , which will then use the session key to decrypt the message, split , accordingly and then encrypt , , ,
, and into separate messages by using the session keys and , then sends them to the leaf node readers and . Subsequently, the encrypted messages will be distributed to the corresponding tags. The leaf reader will then collect pieces of proof from the tags, which is then transmitted back to the upper levels then to reader to generate a grouping proof as shown in the steps in Figure 4 .
3.)
After receiving the encrypted message from , the reader proceeds to decrypt the message using the session key then depending on the child node, splits , and accordingly then encrypt , , , , , by using the child node session key as message then transmit to .
4.)
Upon receiving the encrypted message from , the leaf node reader uses its session key to decrypt the message The multicast message is constructed, then encrypted using the group key along with , , , , and thentransmitted to the corresponding tags to generate pieces of proof.
5.)
When any tag receives a multicast message , the tag will proceed to decrypt the encrypted message by using the shared key , and then verify if the decrypted message contains the correct and ownership transfer request . When the verification is correct, the shared key is then employed to compute the pieces of proof along with the tag , a randomly generated number , and a timestamp (if offline then else ). Subsequently, a message verification code is computed for the reader to verify by using the hashing value , the shared key , the timestamp , pieces of proof , and a random number .
6.)
In order to verify the message integrity, a leaf node reader receives a response messages from the tags, the obtained , , and tag verification value transmitted from previously, and further, the reader computes . By comparing with the message verification code transmitted by the tags, the reader will be able to block and prevent proof that is not associated with this delivery. Subsequently, the reader will employ the XOR operation to combine all of the pieces of proof and the verification code into pieces of proof and message verification code . The pieces of proof generated by the reader are then computed using the shared key along with the reader identification code and randomly generated numbers and . A message verification code is also computed by hashing , and . The session key will be used to encrypt , , , , , and for all group member tags then later transmitted back to parent node reader . After the parent node reader receives the response message transmitted by child node reader , the encrypted message will be decrypted by using the session key to verify if the message contains the same recipient . Once the recipient is authenticated, the reader , will use the same method as the reader , to generate the required message, then transmit the message to the reader at the upper level, and finally back to the reader .
D. The Integrity Verification Phase (Stage 3)
As shown in Figure 5 , Stage 3 shows that the reader has received a response message from the recipient . 
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7.)
Once all the messages transmitted by the child node reader are verified, the reader combines all of the pieces of proof received from into a combine proof . The shared key is employed to generate the grouping proof by using identification code , a random number generated by reader , and the combined proof . The grouping proof is then transmitted to the transporter's tags to be signed.
8.)
When the transporter's tag receives a request message from the reader to sign the grouping proof , a random number will be generated to be used along with the transporter's private key to sign grouping proof into a signed proof . Once signed, the signed proof and the random number will be transmitted back to the reader .
9.)
After the reader receives the response message from the transporter's tag, the signed proof is then transmitted to the recipient's tag. Using the randomly generated numbers and the private key , the recipient uses the signing function to sign into the signed proof . Similar to the transporter's tag, the signed proof and random number will be transmitted back to the reader .
10.)
If the reader cannot connect to the verifier, the timestamp and the signed proof must be transmitted back to trusted clock tag to ensure that the timestamp generated under offline conditions is trustworthy. However, if the reader can connect to the verifier when it receives the signed grouping proof , then the grouping proof can be directly transmitted to the verifier to confirm whether grouping proof has completed within the time threshold. In the situation where the reader cannot connect to the verifier, the timestamp , and the signed proof will be transmitted to the clock tag for encryption.
12.)
When the clock tag receives a request message to verify the signed proof , the clock tag will first compare the difference between the system time and the time , where is the time for initializing the grouping proof. If the time difference is below the threshold value, the clock tag will employ the shared key along with , , to generate a final grouping proof therefore proving that all of the tags, the transporter, and the recipient are completed with the time interval. The grouping proofs and will then be encrypted into the message , which will then transmitted back to the reader and then to the verifier once a connection becomes available for further verification.
E. The Dispute Resolution Phase
When the verifier receives the final grouping proof from the reader , the verifier will then proceed to confirm the integrity of the received proof. If , then the shared key will be employed to decrypt the message to retrieve the grouping proof and timestamp . The grouping proof is retrieved by computing , and compare to verify the integrity of authentication message received from the clock tag. Otherwise, if , the verifier will directly compute the time difference between the current system time and the timestamp to check if it's done within the time threshold. Subsequently, the proof will be decrypted using the recipient's public key and the random number to obtain the signed proof , then it is decrypted using transporter's public key and random number to obtain grouping proof . The verifier will then compute to compare if the received grouping proof is identical, thus completing the grouping proof protocol.
F. The Ownership Transfer Phase (Stage 1)
Once the verifier confirms that the received proof from reader has no issue, it proceeds to generate a new ownership shared key for recipient, as shown in Figure 5 .
13.)
The verifier uses the tag current shared key and the random number gathered from the grouping proof to compute a new ownership shared key . Subsequently, two encrypted messages are generated using the recipient's public key and the tags shared key . The encrypted message consists of the recipient identification code , the new ownership shared key , the tags identification code , and the new timestamp while consists of the new ownership shared key and the tags identification code . A new set of group keys is also being generated then later transmit to the reader along with , and .
G. The Ownership Transfer Phase (Stage 2)
After receiving the transmitted message from the verifier, proceeds to encrypt the message using the session key along with and group key as encrypted message . Both of the encrypted messages and are transmitted to the recipient's tags and reader simultaneously.
14.)
Once the recipient's tag received the encrypted messages from reader , the recipient's tag will proceed to decrypt the message and verify if the is correct. If the verification is successful, the recipient's tag will update the current ownership shared key with the new ownership shared key .
15.)
After receiving the encrypted message from , the reader proceeds to decrypt the message using the session key then depending on the child node, splits (refer to Figure 3 ) accordingly then encrypt , , and by using child node session key as the message then transmit it to the reader . Upon receiving the encrypted message from , the leaf node reader uses its session key to decrypt the encrypted message All group keys in are extracted and the multicast message is encrypted by using the group keys along with , and then transmitted to each tag.
17.)
When any tag receives a multicast message , the tag will proceed to decrypted the message using the shared key , and then determine if the decrypted message contains the correct . If the is correct, the message will be decrypted to retrieved the for further confirmation. When the message is successfully authenticated, the tag will proceed to update its current ownership shared key with the new ownership shared key .
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS Based on the assumption of one-way hashing function (OHF for short), we present the security analysis of the proposed protocol.
A. Replay Attack
Assume that an attacker can intercept all the previous generated grouping proof messages transmitted between all communicating parties, and then resend them. However, each pieces of proof contains at least a random number , timestamps , or , and the recipients can verify if the messages were sent previously according to the timestamps.
B. Denial of Proof
Suppose that a malicious attacker intercepts all the previous generated grouping proof messages transmitted between all communicating parties, and further, attempts to generate a bogus proof by using fake information. Every pieces of proof contains a verification code that only the verifier and tags know. If the attacker wants to generate a valid proof, he has to obtain the secret . The attacker might attempt to retrieve from the intercepted messages. However, he cannot obtain the due to the assumption of one hash function (OHF).
C. Denial of Service
When a malicious attacker interrupts the interaction between the reader and the tags by intercepting or blocking the shared key update message, this might cause the tag to lose synchronization with the verifier. In the proposed protocol, the verifier stores the both old ownership shared key and the new ownership shared key . In any case of DOS attack by blocking these shared key update messages, the verifier would still be able to authenticate the tags.
D. Forward Secrecy
Without knowing the previous ownership shared key , the new owner (recipient ) cannot decrypt the message transmitted between the tags and its former owner (supplier). . Therefore, without the new ownership shared key, the former owner (supplier) will not be able to track further message transmitted between the new owner and the tags.
Recipient
F. Message Integrity
Each legitimate tags generates a random number to compute pieces of proof . A verification code is also included in the response message in the proposed protocol. Suppose that a malicious attacker attempts to modified the transmitted messages, and he has to generate a legitimate proof for the modified messages. Without the shared key , he cannot dervive a valid verification code , and he might retrieve the from the intercepted messages. However, he cannot obtain the due to the assumption of OHF.
IV. CONCLUSION This paper proposes an interesting approach in where a grouping proof and ownership transfer can be employed simultaneously without hindering grouping proof mechanism of the original protocol [14] . In addition, in terms of security and privacy, we have evaluated that the proposed protocol can prevent most known attacks such as replay attack, denial of service, etc. that aims to exploit the message transmitted between the readers and the tags.
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